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Somali Piracy—
Are We at the End Game?
Jon Huggins* & Liza Kane-Hartnett†
“Somali Piracy—Are We at the End Game?” examines the
current state of Somali piracy and provides recommendations
for reaching a sustainable solution both at sea and onshore. The
authors provide a detailed background on international efforts to
mitigate piracy and over the course of the article attempt to put
the goals of both nations and international organizations, and
the shipping industry, into context by: (1) assessing how close
we have come to the “End Game” of piracy; (2) taking a closer
look at the current positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating
the primary factors that must be considered in developing a
long-term and sustainable solution at sea; and (4) addressing
the importance of on-shore based initiatives. They conclude that
while the initial crisis has been mitigated, a continued
commitment and an increased focus on onshore initiatives are
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needed to ensure that a long-term and sustainable solution to
Somali-based piracy is reached.
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I.

Introduction

The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) program, a project of the One
Earth Future Foundation,1 was initiated at the absolute height of the
Somali piracy crisis in the fall of 2010. At that time, nearly 700
hostages were being held in over thirty ships off the coast of Somalia.
In order to understand the complex nature of the piracy attacks, and
the equally complex response, OBP cultivated a relationship with
multiple stakeholders across the international navies, maritime
nations, industries, advocacy groups, and academia.
After initial setbacks, where the pirates seemed able to adapt and
effectively counter actions taken by the international community, the
response at sea finally turned the tide against the Somali pirates.
Through the combined efforts of industry and navies, pirate attacks
were suppressed, and pirate groups were mostly deterred from

1.

The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) program is a project of the One
Earth Future Foundation, a privately funded and independent nonprofit organization located in Colorado, USA. OBP was launched in
2010 with the intent to develop a response to maritime piracy through:
mobilizing stakeholders from the maritime community; developing
public-private partnerships to promote long-term solutions at sea and
ashore; and encouraging sustainable deterrence based on the rule of law.
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launching new assaults.2 Much of the coordination required to
accomplish this can be credited to the efforts of the Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),3 the Shared Awareness and
De-confliction (SHADE) coordination mechanism for navies,4 and
industry efforts to coordinate ship self-defense through agreed Best
Management Practices (BMP).
Throughout this three-year process, OBP has remained engaged
by close association with CGPCS activities and by convening
meetings with relevant stakeholders. After the international
community achieved a milestone of six consecutive months without a
successful pirate attack by the fall of 2012, OBP asked its partners to
participate in a working group to develop expectations and define the
desired end state to the Somali piracy threat. For the purposes of
defining goals, the group was split between members of the shipping
industry and those representing nations and international
organizations. The group representing the nations and international
organizations determined that continued observance of BMP and a
sustained international navy presence would facilitate a move toward
regional leadership and development ashore, establishing a safe and
sustainable environment for merchant vessels and seafarers in the Red
Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The
group representing the shipping industry came to a similar conclusion,
desiring to establish a set of conditions in the Red Sea, the Gulf of
Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean whereby vessels can
return to transit procedures and self-protection requirements in place
before 2005 without undue risk to the crew.
Over the course of this article, we shall attempt to put these goals
into context by: (1) assessing how close we have come to the “End
Game” for Somali-based piracy; (2) taking a closer look at the current
positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating the primary factors that
must be considered in developing a long-term and sustainable solution
at sea; and (4) addressing the importance of shore-based initiatives.

2.

See Piracy Falls in 2012, but Seas off East and West Africa Remain
Dangerous Says IMB, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2013/Piracy-falls-in-2012,-butseas-off-East-and-West-Africa-remain-dangerous,-says-IMB/.

3.

See Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Quarterly
Update, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/fs/2013/219088.htm (summarizing CGPCS’ efforts to curtail the
incidents and effects of piracy through international cooperation).

4.

See, e.g., 19th SHADE Meets to Discuss Counter-Piracy, COMBINED
MAR. FORCES (May 17, 2011), http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/
2011/05/17/19th-shade-meets-to-discuss-counter-piracy/ (stating that
SHADE meets regularly to coordinate the efforts of multiple military
forces in order to combat piracy).
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II. Are We Ready to Declare “End Game?”
With the dramatic drop in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and
Western Indian Ocean, some stakeholders are cautiously asking
whether the international community has successfully ended
Somali-based piracy. The fact that knowledgeable policymakers are
having this debate indicates that things are going much better than
they could have hoped just eighteen months ago. On the surface,
much of the evidence supports a conclusion that the problem has been
solved. For example, reported attacks have dropped by more than 80
percent between 2011 and 2012;5 2013 saw a continued decline, with
the IMB reporting only 15 incidents, both actual and attempted
attacks, attributed to Somali pirates.6 The number of hostages has
dropped to fewer than 100 in 2013—down from a high of around 700
hostages at the beginning of 2011.7 Finally, as of May 2013, it had
been more than a year since pirates had hijacked and held a ship.8
In spite of the good news, the world has not yet reaped the
benefits from this drop in attacks. The cost of suppressing piracy in
terms of first order costs had only decreased by around 20 percent to
around $6 billion according to the latest Economic Cost of Piracy
Report by OBP.9 The World Bank has also estimated that, even in a
down year, piracy impacted the global economy to the tune of around

5.

See Alaric Nightingale, Somali Pirates Seize 80% Fewer Ships as Early
Strikes Work, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-01-19/piracy-declines-for-first-time-in-five-years-as-naviesintervene.html.

6.

See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS: REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2013, at 5
(2014).

7.

See OFFICER OF THE WATCH, MARITIME PIRACY MONTHLY REPORT 2
(2013), available at http://officerofthewatch.files.wordpress.com/2013/
09/oow-piracy-monthly-report-2013-081.pdf; KAIJA HURLBURT & CYRUS
MODY, THE HUMAN COST OF SOMALI PIRACY 2011, at 3 (2012), available
at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View
%20Full%20Report_0.pdf.

8.

See No Somali Pirate Hijacking in Nearly a Year, Says UN, THE
GUARDIAN (May 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
may/03/somali-pirate-hijacking (stating that while pirate attacks were
still occurring, there had not been a successful pirate attack since
May 2012).

9.

Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Piracy 2012, at iv (2013)
(working paper) (on file with Oceans Beyond Piracy & One Earth
Future
Found.),
available
at
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%2
0Full%20Report_1.pdf.
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$18 billion when the secondary impacts were considered.10 Thus,
despite successful suppression efforts, the international community is
still paying a premium price in its fight against piracy.

III. A Closer Examination of Positive Trends and
Statistics
A.

Attack Reporting

While reported attacks are down 80 percent since 2011, there are
signs that some attacks may have only been reported amongst
internal channels of owners and flag states, meaning that the attacks
were not included in international databases and reporting. Earlier
this year, two of the leading reporting agencies made the following
appeals:
It has come to our attention that some private military security
companies are reporting suspicious incidents through their
internal communication channels and then to their customers. It
is in all seafarer[s]’ interest[s] that any concerns are reported
immediately by phone to [the United Kingdom Maritime Trade
Organization] UKMTO in accordance with BMP4.11

Additionally, the NATO Shipping Center also issued a call for more
timely and accurate reporting in a weekly report from February 2013,
stating:
It has been observed that some Masters are choosing to phone
their Company Security Officer (CSO) first in the event of a
piracy incident. However, one of the fundamental requirements
of BMP4 is that UKMTO is the primary point of contact for
merchant vessels during piracy incidents in the HRA. This aims
to avoid unnecessary delay and prevent inaccurate or
incomplete information from reaching military commanders.12

In addition to calls for more accurate reporting by information centers
serving the Indian Ocean, there was circumstantial evidence that
indicated that not all attacks were being reported. First, based on
military statistics, the span between the end of 2011 and the start of
2012 was a particularly active time for Pirate Action Groups
10.

See THE WORLD BANK, THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT,
REBUILDING
A
NATION
5
(2013),
available
at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17672066/piratessomalia-ending-threat-rebuilding-nation.

11.

Kaija Hurlburt & D. Conor Seyle, The Human Cost of Maritime Piracy
2012, at 33 (Oceans Beyond Piracy & One Earth Future Found.,
Working Paper, 2013) (on file with OBP).

12.

Id.
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(PAGs).13 Many of these groups were observed operating in critical
areas in the Indian Ocean, but this high number of potential attackers
was not consistent with the low number of attacks actually reported
based on historic rates.14 Second, the success rate for attacks (based
on the number of successful attacks as a percentage of total attacks)
actually increased in 2012 after showing a downward trend over the
previous two years.15 This increase runs counter to the widely held
belief that ships were less vulnerable after implementing BMP and
other measures. Finally, there is ample anecdotal evidence from both
Somali sources and from private companies themselves that not all
attacks are reported and that many encounters have occurred in
which neither party (the private security team or the pirates) had
motive to report the incident.16
B.

The Shipping Industry’s Continued Commitment

At the height of the piracy crisis in 2010–2011, the shipping
industry made enormous commitments to protect its vessels. As
documented in the Economic Cost of Piracy Reports by OBP,
measures adopted by the shipping industry amounted to around
$5 billion over the course of 2012, which represented around
85 percent of the total direct costs of piracy to the international
community.17 The measures taken by the shipping industry were
encapsulated in an industry-generated, self-governing mechanism
called the “Best Management Practices (BMP) for Protection against
Recommended
measures
included
Somalia-Based
Piracy.”18
ship-hardening techniques, suggestions for increased vigilance of crew,
increased transit speeds, and established re-routing procedures. Also
incorporated by most of the industry was the practice of developing a
safe room, or “Citadel,” where a crew could safely retreat in the event
of a piracy attack until a naval response could be summoned.19
13.

THE WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at xxii (2013) (showing figures
indicating a peak in piracy incidents in Somalia in 2011 and early 2012).

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17.

Bellish, supra note 9, at 1–4 (finding that the shipping industry incurred
protection costs through, among others, armed guards and ransom
payments, where the total direct costs of piracy to the international
community was between $5.7 and $6.1 billion).

18.

Bibi van Ginkel & Lennart Landman, In Search of a Sustainable and
Coherent Strategy, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 727, 740 (2012).

19.

Id.; see also BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST SOMALI BASED PIRACY 5, 7 (2011), available at
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5
_2011.pdf [hereinafter BMP4].
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At the height of the crisis, it was estimated that up to 80 percent
of the shipping industry was practicing this expensive set of
recommendations in spite of the industry’s economic downturn that
had created very slim profit margins.20 However, the fact that so
many companies were observing these practices created a “level
playing field,” which ensured that no company could reap an
economic advantage. This system was sustainable until the perceived
lack of threat led some companies to unilaterally stop participation
and revert to pre-BMP practices by slowing down their vessels,
“cutting the corner” by Somalia, and disregarding other
ship-hardening recommendations in the BMP.21
The shipping industry has also reluctantly agreed to undertake
the embarkation of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
(PCASP). These teams, which cost an average of $40,000 to $60,000
per transit,22 are not only expensive but also logistically challenging to
embark and leave the industry vulnerable to liability issues. It should
be noted that the use of armed security is not a part of BMP
procedures but was understood to be a means of supplementary
protection for vulnerable vessels. Although the use of PCASP is
completely voluntary, it is estimated that up to 60 percent of the
ships transiting the high-risk areas of the Indian Ocean routinely
embark these teams, and many use them as replacements for
implementing other BMP recommendations.23
Over the last several months, there have been decreases in
registered and reporting vessels as well as documented evidence that
ships are traveling closer to the coast and transiting at slower
speeds.24 This un-leveling of the playing field has essentially
20.

Stephen Askins, Creation of New Industrial Standards and Compliance
Regulations 1 (June 2012) (on file with the United Arab Emirates
Counter Piracy Conference), available at http://www.counterpiracy.ae/
upload/Briefing/Stephen%20Askins-Essay-Eng-2.pdf.

21.

See Ships Cutting Corners, SEC. ASS’N FOR THE MAR. INDUS. (Sept. 27,
2013),
http://www.seasecurity.org/2013/09/ships-cutting-corners/
(stating that with fewer attacks, more ships are “sneaking around the
corner” near Somali coasts, risking pirate attacks).

22.

Id.

23.

Bellish, supra note 9, at 19; see also Robert Wright, Ships Slow Down in
Pirate Waters to Save Fuel, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 7, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6d962e-984e-11e1-ad3e-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz2pnRml8Xf. (noting that “shipping companies have switched
to relying on guards . . . for protection”).

24.

See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Ships with Armed Guards Seen Not
Reporting Somali Pirate Strikes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-23/ships-with-armed-guardsseen-not-reporting-somali-pirate-strikes.html; Ships Cutting Corners,
supra note 21; Wright, supra note 23.
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jeopardized further shipping industry support for following BMP, as
most companies will not continue to participate in procedures that
leave them at a competitive disadvantage.
C.

The Naval Response

The involvement of international navies has been a leading factor
in reducing the incidence of piracy at sea. Since 2009, three
international navy coalitions, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta,
NATO Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force-151
(CTF-151), have been patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Western
Indian Ocean.25 These coalitions are in addition to several unaffiliated
nations who have also contributed their efforts. These so-called
“independent deployers,” including China, Russia, South Korea, and
Japan, have also made significant contributions.26 Further, the NATO
and EU efforts are currently authorized by political mandate through
the end of 2014,27 while the U.S.-sponsored CTF-151 has an undefined
commitment to counter piracy.28 Although it is believed that both the
NATO and EU mandates will be extended through 2016, it is of
importance to note that nations still must volunteer their forces, and
a political mandate does not guarantee adequate forces will be
generated. In this age of military austerity and fiscal constraint, many
nations may abstain from participation, especially in light of the
perceived lower threat level. In addition to the vessels and aircrafts
patrolling the high-risk areas, coordination mechanisms, such as
SHADE, have been created to coordinate naval activity in the Indian
Ocean.29
D.

The Possible Return to Historic (Pre-Piracy) Levels
of Maritime Security

As indicated in the response from the shipping industry, there is a
strong desire to return to shipping patterns and protections in place
prior to the current outbreak of piracy. As we have also seen, the slow
atrophy of those companies committing to the continued use of BMP
has un-leveled the playing field and may render it economically
unfeasible for some shipping companies to continue. Essentially, a de
facto abandonment of BMP might already be occurring. However,
before the official change to pre-piracy levels of maritime security can
be made, it will be necessary to assess a number of factors to
25.

Bellish, supra note 9, at 14 (describing EUNAVFOR’s Operation
Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and CTF-151).

26.

Id. at 3.

27.

Id. at 14.

28.

See id. at 15 (showing that there is no termination date for CTF-151).

29.

Id. at 17.
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determine the minimum amount of protection that must remain in
place in order to ensure safety for vessels at sea.
One important factor to consider is that the publicity generated
from successful pirate attacks on both the east and west coasts of
Africa has brought to light the vulnerabilities of merchant vessels that
can be exploited by criminal elements. Modern ships are meant to
deliver goods in an efficient and cost effective manner. Consequently,
these ships are manned with a minimum number of crewmembers,
meaning that a large tanker could be manned by as few as fifteen to
eighteen crewmen.30 This leaves very few crewmen available for extra
watch duties and to respond to attacks; in contrast, navy frigates and
destroyers can be manned by upwards of 200 people.31 Ships are also
made to efficiently operate at relatively slow speeds in order to save
on bunkering fuel, and many have very low freeboards (i.e., low in the
water) when loaded with product—thus providing easier access for
pirate attacks.32 The small number of crewmen, slow operating speeds,
and low deck heights above the water make some categories of
modern merchant vessels inherently vulnerable to the kinds of attacks
that Somali pirates mastered by the mid-2000s.
In addition to the physical characteristics of the vessels, there
have also been changes in the dynamics of the maritime sector that
have altered traditional relationships between a vessel and the flag it
carries. Whereas in the past, ships were registered with traditional
nautical nations with large navies, the shift to Open Registries
(sometimes called Flags of Convenience) means that this close
connection no longer exists.33 In practice, this means that the
traditional naval powers have no direct obligation to protect vessels
flagged in other nations and has created a disconnect in which the
large flag states for merchant vessels are not associated with the large

30.

See N. WINCHESTER ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF CREWING LEVELS: FINDINGS
FROM THE SIRC GLOBAL LABOUR MARKET SURVEY 12–13 (2006),
available at http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/publications/Analysis%
20of%20crewing%20levels.pdf (finding that some larger vessels do not
contain a proportionate level of staff).

31.

Bellish, supra note 9, at 16.

32.

See Phillip J. Ballou, Ship Efficiency Management Requires a Total
Solution Approach, 47 MAR. TECH. SOC’Y J. 83, 83 (2013) (stating that
reduced speeds lead to lower fuel consumption); see also Peter Shadbolt,
Asia’s Sea Pirates Target Treasure of Marine Fuel, CNN (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/08/world/asia/asia-piracy/index.
html (explicating how a ship’s low freeboard risks pirate attacks).

33.

David F. Matlin, Note, Re-Evaluating the Status of Flags of
Convenience Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1017,
1019–20 (1991) (explaining Open Registries and their advantages).
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naval powers.34 Due to this shift in the traditional relationship
between navies and merchant ships, a new model for the protection of
shipping must focus on cooperation amongst multiple stakeholders in
the maritime sector.

IV. Assumptions and Primary Factors for
Consideration
Based on the above arguments, the following assumptions can be
made regarding what a safe and sustainable End Game for countering
piracy must take into account:
(1)

Due to exposed vulnerabilities of modern shipping, ship
owners must commit to retain some parts of BMP in order
to ensure the safety of their vessels and cannot expect to
go back to historical levels and methods of protection; and

(2)

Due to the lack of a firm relationship between the flag
state and the ship-owner, large navies can no longer be
relied on as the sole guarantors of protection from
maritime crime: a multi-stakeholder solution must be
implemented.

Taking in to account the assumptions above, several specific
issue-areas should be examined to determine changes necessary to
establish a sustainable solution to piracy over the longer term.
A.

Factor One: Response Capability at Sea

Intervention by naval forces has been the traditional response for
piracy incidents. The initial area of the Somali threat, the Gulf of
Aden, was small enough to reasonably expect a navy response to the
threat of attacks. However, the success of the navy forces in detecting
and disrupting attacks caused the pirates to turn to the Somali Basin
along the Eastern coast of Somalia and later across the whole of the
Indian Ocean.35 This increase in range was made possible by the
pirates’ use of captured mother ships to provide increased range. Once
the High Risk Area (HRA) had expanded to this extent, the navies
reached out to the shipping industry to help provide better reporting,
information sharing and increased use of citadels to allow more time
for an effective response. Another demand on naval forces,
34.

Cf. id. at 1053 (recounting cases where open registry vessels had subpar
conditions, partly due to the fact that “the flag state did not have a
genuine link, [and] the flag state could not exert effective control over
the vessel so as to avoid these substandard conditions”).

35.

See Lee Willett, Pirates and Power Politics: Naval Presence and Grand
Strategy in the Horn of Africa, 156 RUSI J. 20, 22 (2011) (detailing a
“balloon effect” of the navy pushing pirates into other areas).
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particularly the EU Naval Forces, was the requirement to provide
individual escorts for humanitarian support vessels, World Food
Program shipping carriers, and other vulnerable vessels. 36
In light of increased demand on these assets, the navies have
increasingly relied on embarked uniformed security teams, known as
Vessel Protection Detachments, to protect vulnerable shipping and to
free up patrolling assets. 37 Naval forces are also economized through a
focus on more intelligence-driven tactics to identify, track and disrupt
PAGs. This proactive response has better focused navy efforts but
relies heavily on expensive intelligence and surveillance assets, which
are in high demand in other theaters. Lastly, in order to maximize the
impact of the various naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the SHADE
process was developed to better integrate the navy forces of the three
larger coalitions as well as independent deployers. SHADE provides
the forum for participating nations to de-conflict patrol areas,
organize convoy protection along the Internationally Recognized
Transit Corridor, and coordinate the use of scarce assets such as
surveillance platforms and re-fueling tankers. 38
However, in spite of all these efforts, navies still were unable to
provide individual protection for all vessels. In response, the shipping
industry adopted the practice of hiring private security teams to repel
pirates at the point of attack. While many of these teams were
deployed before they were officially sanctioned by flag states and
coastal nations, there was eventual consensus across most
stakeholders that the guards were necessary as an interim measure to
protect vessels and crews. It should be noted, however, that the
industry is strongly opposed to “institutionalizing” the use of armed
guards and would like to turn away from this requirement as soon as
practicable. 39
Some have argued that the long-term solution to maintaining a
response capability for piracy attacks is to build up regional forces,
36.

See Fact Sheet: EU NAVFOR Somalia—Operation ATALANTA,
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/
missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-somalia/pdf/16102012_factsheet_eunavfor-somalia_en.pdf (last updated Oct. 16, 2012) (outlining the
objectives of the EU’s Operation Atalanta, including protection of
World Food Programme vessels).

37.

See JAMES BROWN, LOWY INSTIT. FOR INT’L POLICY, PIRATES AND
PRIVATEERS: MANAGING THE INDIAN OCEAN’S PRIVATE SECURITY BOOM
9 (2012).

38.

See Andrew Muratore, EU-NATO Co-Operation and the Pirates of the
Gulf of Aden, 2 AUSTL. J. MAR. & OCEAN AFF. 90, 100 (2010) (describing
the purpose of SHADE).

39.

See PETER CHALK ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INSTIT.,
COUNTERING PIRACY IN THE MODERN ERA 6 (2009), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF269.html.
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including a Somali coast guard.40 While some forces in the area,
particularly those from Seychelles and Kenya, have some capability
for responding to attacks, the ability of regional forces to respond to
piracy attacks on the high seas is considered to be many years away.
This issue is compounded by the fact that the Somali coast, the
longest in Africa, is not expected to have any organic capability for
the foreseeable future.
In sum, we propose that one short-term solution to the piracy
problem is continued international naval presence and coordination
mechanisms, with increased emphasis on proactive, intelligence-based
actions. Further, working with regional and coastal nations to
facilitate private armed security teams and then improving
cooperation between the regional teams and navy forces would also be
another short-term consideration. These cooperation measures could
include: (1) more transparent and consistent laws on embarkation
across coastal states; and (2) consistent reporting and overseeing of
private teams based on internationally recognized processes (e.g.,
International Code of Conduct, International Standards Organization
processes). However, the international community should also take
into account the long-term solution of building regional capacity to
provide responses to piracy incidents and increase regional leadership
in coordination processes such as SHADE.
B.

Factor Two: Maritime Situational Awareness and Reporting

In order to provide an effective response at sea, a comprehensive
understanding of where both friendly and merchant traffic is located,
as well as an understanding of where suspect or threatening vessels
are lurking, is required. Collectively, this information is known as
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).41 The wide range of factors
that contribute to MSA include: position self-reporting by vessels,
radar contacts, Automated Information System (AIS) transponder
information, reports by naval vessels and coast watchers, Long Range
Information and Tracking (LRIT) information provided by flag states,
and information provided by other vessels at sea.42 The SHADE
40.

See Ken Menkhaus, Dangerous Waters, 51 SURVIVAL 21, 25 (2009)
(describing the need for a Somali coast guard and stronger local law
enforcement).

41.

Capt. Dale Ferriere et al., The Office of Global Maritime Situational
Awareness: A Collaborative Approach to Government Information
Sharing, 66 PROCEEDINGS 10, 11 (2009) (stating that the goal of MSA is
to improve knowledge of the maritime domain by persistent monitoring
so that trends and anomalies can be detected).

42.

See, e.g., A Review of Federal Maritime Domain Awareness Programs:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Mar. Transp. of the H.
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 112th Cong. (2012) (written
testimony of Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard Deputy
Commandant for Operations) (explaining how the U.S. Coast Guard
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mechanism has also been used to ensure optimal employment of
surveillance platforms and coordination of vessel information to
ensure any gaps in coverage are addressed.
A comprehensive MSA system enables faster navy reaction, better
protection for vulnerable shipping, and proactive re-routing from
emerging threats at sea. This system is largely in place but is heavily
reliant on international structures such as the EU’s Maritime Security
Center – Horn of Africa (MSC-HoA) and the UKMTO.43 The missions
of these organizations are based on crisis response mandates that
must be renewed by political decisions of their parent organizations
and cannot be relied upon indefinitely.44
Regional structures, such as the Information Sharing Centers
(ISCs) in Sana’a, Dar Es Salaam, and Mombasa, and the Regional
Maritime Coordination Centers (RMCCs) throughout the Indian
Ocean have thus far had limited involvement in developing MSA.
This is largely due to limited funding, training and equipment and
their inability to coordinate timely responses to attacks.45 There is
also a lack of trust from the shipping companies, which are hesitant
to provide the regional structures with sensitive information.
However, because of their permanent mandates, regional structures
offer a logical and long-term solution to building permanent MSA
once their current weaknesses can be overcome. Thus, the
international community should consider reform as a three-tiered
process, where transitioning from reporting infrastructure and MSA to
regional organizations and leadership is the ultimate long-term goal.
To reach this final stage, the international community should begin
with a short-term, immediate strategy of establishing closer liaisons
and information sharing between the shipping industry, private
utilizes AIS, LRIT, and other systems to increase maritime domain
awareness).
43.

See About MSCHOA and OP Atalanta, MAR. SEC. CTR.—HORN OF
AFR., http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us (last visited Dec. 30,
2013) (explaining how MSC-HoA provides 24-hour monitoring and
coordination between shipping and military forces); see generally UK
Maritime Trade Operation, ROYAL NAVY, http://www.royalnavy.mod.
uk/Operations/Maritime-Security/Keeping-the-Sea-Lanes-Open/UKMaritime-Trade-Operation (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (explaining how
UKMTO acts as the main point of contact for commercial vessels and
the military in the region).

44.

See About MSCHOA and OP Atalanta, supra note 43 (describing
MSC-HoA’s mission for Operation Atalanta, where its mandate is
subject to EU Council Joint Action approval).

45.

See Press Briefing: Piracy Information-Sharing Centre in Mombasa
Commissioned by IMO Secretary-General, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 31,
2011),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/15mombasa-isc.aspx (announcing the creation of the Mombasa RMCC,
and explaining the function of other ISCs and RMCCs).
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security teams, and navies, with a focus on incentivizing cooperation.
As a medium-term consideration, the international community should
continue the SHADE mechanism as the means to integrate
international and regional efforts.
C.

Factor Three: Law Enforcement on the High Seas

To successfully develop a sustainable solution to Somali-based
piracy, a myriad of legal issues will need to be resolved and a
framework put in place for the prosecution and imprisonment of those
convicted. Although we have seen an improvement in the willingness
of some nations to prosecute pirates, the high percentage of “catch
and release” incidents, where pirates caught red-handed are released
back on the beach, highlights the many legal issues that need to be
resolved in order to develop a long-term solution. Much of the lack of
clarity surrounding the legal side of piracy stems from the confusion
surrounding overlapping jurisdictions. While historically a flag state
represented the owner, crew, and interest of a vessel, this is not true
in present day; each incident of piracy affects numerous countries.
This is because the ship-owner, crew, and flag can all hail from
different nations, giving any incident a multinational nature. Due to
the resulting vacuum of accountability, pirates are often released
without standing trial or being held accountable for their crimes.
Prosecuting pirates is easy on paper, yet hard in practice.
Although piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction, a lack of both
political will and evidence sharing creates difficulties. Some of the lack
of political will stems from the economic cost of both prosecution and
imprisonment, which cost the international community $14.89 million
in 2012.46 The high costs provide a deterrent not only for the
international community but also for Somalia, regional nations,
seafaring nations, and flag states that do not have the economic
capacity to finance trials or the physical capacity to hold the pirates
in their prisons. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime has provided
support to these nations by both financing the trials and
imprisonments, as well as through the building of prisons in Garowe,
Puntland, and Hargeisa and Bossaso in Somaliland.47 Additionally,
Working Group Two of the CGPCS has spearheaded efforts to
establish transfer agreements, allowing arresting authorities to

46.

Bellish, supra note 9, at 27.

47.

See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, COUNTER PIRACY PROGRAMME:
SUPPORT TO THE TRIAL AND RELATED TREATMENT OF PIRACY SUSPECTS,
ISSUE 11, at 3 (2013) (reporting the construction of various correctional
facilities for convicted pirates).
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transfer suspects for trial and prosecuting nations to transfer
convicted pirates back to Somalia for incarceration.48
Apart from the high cost of prosecuting and imprisoning pirates,
the lack of standardized evidence gathering and sharing makes it
difficult to produce a full range of evidence in court. This has
improved through the years with organizations, such as INTERPOL,
launching initiatives aimed at improving evidence collection and
dissemination, building regional capacity to arrest and investigate
cases, and improving coordination and information-sharing among
other organizations, such as Europol, NCIS, SOCA, and NATO.49
Although improvements have been made, a continued commitment is
needed to ensure that the regional nations, and Somalia particularly,
have the capacity to respond to piracy through a rule of law
approach.
Another factor, albeit unique to Somalia, is the lack of awareness
and understanding of international legal procedures among the general
public. Consequently, there is no system to notify communities and
families that captured pirates have been prosecuted and incarcerated.
Even though over 1,000 Somali pirates have been convicted or are
awaiting trial, there is no system in place to exploit the messaging
opportunities and build deterrence for piracy using the rule of law.50
In short, we recommend that the international community take
into account three short-term general strategies to combat the piracy
problem: (1) continue to support the building of regional prosecution
capacity in line with U.N. Secretary General-identified goals; (2) gain
full cooperation of all maritime stakeholders to ensure 100% sharing of
evidence for prosecutions; and (3) broaden the scope of nations that
either contribute to regional prosecutions or prosecute, to include
seafaring nations and major flag states. However, through
48.

Working Group 2, CONTACT GRP. ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMAL.,
http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=workSub2 (last visited Sept.
25, 2013).

49.

See generally Maritime Piracy: International Involvement, INTERPOL,
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/Internationalinvolvement (detailing INTERPOL’s work with international
organizations to combat piracy) (last visited Sept. 25, 2013); see also
UK Crime Agency’s Visit to INTERPOL Highlights Co-Operation
Against Transnational Crime, INTERPOL (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2010/N20100408
(showing the cooperation between SOCA and Interpol).

50.

See AMBER RAMSEY, CIVIL MILITARY FUSION CTR., BARRIERS TO
PROSECUTION: THE PROBLEM OF PIRACY 2 (2011), available at
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Piracy/Documents/CFC%20AntiPiracy%20Thematic%20Reports/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_
Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf (suggesting that without a legal
regime to make piracy more risky, there is no adequate deterrent to
piracy).
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(1) ensuring
prosecution;
(2)
consistent
sentencing;
and
(3) coordinating messaging campaigns, the international community
may build long-term and stable deterrence against piracy through rule
of law.
D.

Factor Four: Vessel Awareness/Protection

In response to the crisis of Somali-based piracy the shipping
industry developed a set of voluntary vessel protection measures
known as BMP, intended to decrease the likelihood of a successful
attack as well as provide protection for the crew in the event of a
pirate boarding. The shipping industry has coordinated its initiatives
with other stakeholders in Working Group Three of the CGPCS.51
The first version of BMP was released in February 2009, with the
most recent, version four, released in 2011.52 BMP is built around
three fundamental requirements: (1) register with MSC-HoA;
(2) report to UKMTO; and (3) implement ship protection measures.53
Ship protection measures vary from ship to ship but often include:
providing additional lookouts and enhancing means of operation
through better technology; using increased speeds in HRAs; enhancing
bridge protection; and using physical barriers such as razor wire and
water spray.54
While BMP has proven useful and greatly reduces the chances of
successful attack, these measures are expensive, with re-routing and
increased speeds alone costing the international community over
$1.82 billion in 2012.55 Due to these high costs and the perception that
the threat of Somalia-based piracy has lessened, some in the shipping
industry are slowly moving away from BMP measures. The movement
of some ship-owners away from BMP creates an uneven playing field
and thus encourages more ship-owners to stray from the BMP
guidelines in order to garner a greater profit. Ultimately, the shipping
industry would like to move away from the expensive BMP
recommendations, return to pre-2005 security measures, and ensure
an environment in which vessels can travel at optimum efficiency
without added risk to crew and cargo.
51.

Working Group 3, CONTACT GRP. ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMAL.,
http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=workSub3 (last visited Dec.
30, 2013).

52.

Id.; see Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, MSC.1/Circ.1332 (June 16,
2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Piracy
ArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1.Circ.1332.pdf.

53.

BMP4, supra note 19, at v.

54.

Id. at 7, 23, 25, 28, 32.

55.

See Bellish, supra note 9, at 19 (showing how implementing BMP4
recommendations have led to increased costs).
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Aside from BMP measures, such as vessel hardening, private
security teams have been a major factor in the decrease of successful
pirate attacks, as no commercial vessel with an armed team on board
has been hijacked.56 Although the use of armed teams has been
controversial in the past and is not mentioned in BMP, the teams are
accepted as a necessary, although not ideal or permanent, measure.
However, the presence of armed teams on board vessels creates an
added liability on the ship-owner and/or flag-state, which could be
held accountable in the event of a tragedy. This has already occurred
in the case of the Enrica Lexie, in which Italian Marines
misinterpreted the intent of an approaching vessel and shot and killed
two Indian fishermen.57
While BMP and private security teams have reduced the number
of successful pirate attacks, we cannot declare an End Game to
Somali-based piracy as long as we have defined High Risk and War
Risk Areas. These defined areas are agreed upon by the shipping
industry (HRA) and the Joint War Committee (War Risk Area). As
long as the Risk Areas remain in force and there is a continued need
for armed guards, we cannot consider that we are at the End Game of
the piracy threat.
In the short to medium term, we suggest that it is in the
international community’s best interest, to regulate the use of private
armed teams through internationally applied governance and
consistent application of more transparent coastal state laws. In the
medium term, the international community should consider the
continued need for defined Risk Areas in the Indian Ocean. As a
long-term consideration, regional states and the international
community as a whole should strive to create conditions that obviate
the need for private armed guards.
E.

Factor Five: Conditions of Seafarers

While Somali-based piracy has dropped dramatically, seafarers are
still affected on a daily basis. When transiting the HRA, they put
themselves in harm’s way, often without receiving the proper
preparation or the benefits for which they are eligible. For seafarers,
the actual piracy incident is often just the beginning of the traumatic
situation in which they find themselves; hostages often deal with
psychological, physical, and economic trauma from the time they are
boarded to well after their release. In order to declare a sustainable
end game to piracy, seafarer support should be predictable and
consistent and cover all aspects of seafarer life that have been affected
56.

Id. at 19.

57.

Tom Wright & Margherita Stancati, Italy, India Clash over Ocean
Shooting, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204778604577239163888809948.
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by the incident of piracy, much as other work-related incidents are
handled in other industries.
One of the larger problems in dealing with seafarer issues is the
seafarers’ lack of representation. Seafarers hail predominately from
poor nations and often lack the awareness and education about the
dangers that they may face, the training that they require, and the
benefits that they are eligible to receive.58 This lack of awareness leads
to the exploitation of seafarers by manning agencies and other bodies.
However, while many seafaring nations have a long way to go in
regard to ensuring seafarer awareness and safety, gains have been
made. For instance, seafaring nations such as the Philippines require
seafarers to undergo counter-piracy training prior to embarking on
their voyages. While the training does not prepare seafarers for all
scenarios onboard, seafarers did report an increased feeling of safety
as a result of pre-trip training sessions.59 While nations such as India
and the Philippines have made efforts to increase the awareness of
seafarers,60 other stakeholders intentionally fail to notify seafarers of
potential or imminent entry into the HRA and their right to
disembark. Although seafarers have a right to disembark, many will
not choose this path out of fear of being blacklisted and being unable
to find future work.
Much like the legal issues discussed earlier, the numerous
stakeholders involved in each incident of piracy create a void of
accountability regarding the treatment and support of seafarers. As
previously mentioned, seafarers often do not receive the benefits to
which they are entitled prior to, during, and after a voyage. Economic
benefits are often disregarded, such as double wages for the days
spent in the HRA, which are stipulated in the International
Bargaining Forum-High Risk Area Agreement.61 This omission
impacts not only the seafarer himself but also his family at home, who
rely on his wages. Furthermore, after a hostage situation has been
resolved and the seafarers released, seafarers require a multitude of
services including repatriation and long-term physical and
58.

See Hurlburt & Seyle, supra note 11, at 1 (describing the numerous
difficulties seafarers and their families face in the event of piracy).

59.

See id. at 10 (finding that seafarers felt safer in Somali waters after
receiving briefings on how to use BMP and cope with piracy).

60.

See MPHRP Train the Trainer Sessions in India, MAR. PIRACY
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PROGRAM (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.
mphrp.org/news_details/index.php?NewsID=165; see Press Release,
Nat’l Mar. Polytechnic, NMP Conducts Orientation-Seminar on
Anti-Piracy Course for Seafarers, http://www.nmp.gov.ph/frames/pdf/
FB2.pdf.

61.

See 2012–2014 IBF Framework TCC Agreement, INT’L TRANSP.
WORKERS’
FED’N
art.
17.3,
http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/
seealsodocs/33555/20122014IBFFrameworkTCCAgreement.pdf.
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psychological care. Post-treatment support is rarely provided for
seafarers, and many continue to suffer and are unable to return to
work years after the incident.62 Much of the issue surrounding
payments to seafarers stems from a lack of tracking systems and
administrative bodies to ensure that seafarers receive the necessary
support throughout their voyages as well as after their releases.63
Although information channels and reporting mechanisms have
improved as a result of the efforts of Working Group Three of the
CGPCS, seafarer advocacy groups, flag state commitments, and other
initiatives, more work must be done to ensure seafarer awareness and
safety. Until all hostages are released and seafarers can confidently
travel through the HRAs, piracy is not over.
Therefore, as a short-term consideration, the international
community should take into account solidifying stakeholder
expectations for seafarer welfare before, during, and after attacks
through ongoing Working Group Three efforts. Furthermore, we
suggest that the international community recognize institutionalizing
gains in seafarer welfare as a long-term consideration.

V. Governance Ashore – The Real End Game
for Somali Piracy
The international community has successfully mitigated the crisis
of Somali-based piracy at sea. However, now that the crisis mitigation
phase is over, we must begin to assess and develop the End Game,
which requires a more sustainable level of effort and commitment over
the long term.
While this article mostly addresses the response at sea, there must
be more support and increased commitment through better
governance on shore, security, and economic development. The piracy
business model is founded on poverty, lack of opportunity onshore,
and a lack of governance to keep criminal elements in check. Only by
changing these conditions through efforts on shore and off shore will
piracy be over for good. Breaking the piracy business model must
occur on three different levels: (1) the recruiting pool must decrease;
(2) pirate groups must be disbanded; and (3) financiers must no
longer be willing and/or able to fund PAGs.
The pirate foot soldiers comprise the largest workforce in the
piracy business model and require special attention for the End Game
62.

See Save Our Seafarers Press Release: Seafarer Death Toll Mounts as
Somali Pirates Hijack, Torture, Intimidate & Murder, INT’L TRANSP.
WORKERS’ FED’N (June 20, 2011), http://www.itfglobal.org/pressarea/index.cfm/pressdetail/6110/region/1/section/0/order/1.

63.

Hurlburt & Seyle, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that owners and
companies frequently do not provide support for seafarers, leaving them
to their own resources).
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to be successful. In February 2013, the President of the Federal
Government of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, offered amnesty to
the pirate foot soldiers with the aim of providing them with the
opportunities for alternative means of earning a living. 64 The concept
of reintegrating these pirates into the community is controversial, as
many argue that the pirates are common criminals and should be
imprisoned rather than given a second chance among the community.
Regardless of stance on the issue of reintegration, a framework should
be established for how to deal with the large number of now
out-of-work pirates; as long as the pirate groups are still intact, it is
difficult to argue that piracy is over.
The most influential tier of the Somalia-based piracy business
model is that of the financiers. These individuals are responsible for
providing the money to PAGs. Up to this point, the international
community has not been successful in bringing these people to justice,
and unfortunately, their continued presence signals that action groups
can still be quickly financed and sent to sea. 65

VI. Conclusion
Although the piracy business model has yet to be fully
dismantled, the immediate crisis of Somali-based piracy has been
successfully mitigated. Unfortunately, while the crisis has been
mitigated, the situation on the ground has not improved enough to
declare piracy over and the End Game reached. This article focuses
on ensuring a long-term commitment at sea through the continuation
of naval operations, BMP, and private security, but the conditions
that bred, and continue to breed, piracy still remain in place. For the
international community to truly establish its End Game, we must
see a continued dedication to better governance systems, the building
of regional and Somali legal and institutional capacity, and a
strengthening of security sectors.
64.

See Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Offers Amnesty to
Pirates, THE NEWS TRIBE (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.thenewstribe.
com/2013/02/28/somali-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-offersamnesty-to-pirates/.

65.

See DANIEL J. WHITENECK ET AL., PIRACY ENTERPRISES IN AFRICA 16–18
(2011), available at http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/piracy/
subsaharan-africa/CNA%20-%20Piracy%20Enterprises%20in%20Africa.
pdf (describing three piracy financing business models); see also
Rudolph Atallah, Pirate Financing: Understanding and Combating a
Complex System 2–3 (Apr. 18–19, 2011) (on file with UAE
Counter-Piracy
Summit),
available
at
http://www.
uaecounterpiracysummit.com/briefing_papers/Atallah,%20Pirate%20Fi
nancing%20Understanding%20and%20Combating%20a%20Complex%20
System.pdf (stating that the limited research into key pirate financiers
“represents a gaping hole” in the current counter-piracy approach).
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